FROM STREET-BASED ACTIVISM TO TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE:
UK RADICAL RIGHT NARRATIVES AND COUNTER-NARRATIVES AT A TIME OF TRANSITION
The CARR-Hedayah Radical Right Counter Narratives Project is a year-long project between CARR and Hedayah that is funded by the EU STRIVE programme. It is designed to create one of the first comprehensive online toolkits for practitioners and civil society engaged in radical right extremist counter narrative campaigns. It uses online research to map narratives in nine countries and regions (Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States), proposes counter narratives for these countries and regions, and advises on how to conduct such campaigns in an effective manner. This country report is one of such outputs.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. William Allchorn is a specialist on anti-Islamic protest movements and radical right social movements in the UK and Western Europe. His PhD thesis mapped political, policing and local authority responses to the English Defence League in five UK locations. William has recently finished his first academic monograph with Routledge – looking at policy responses to the EDL and Britain First over the past decade. His previous published work has looked at the dynamics of activism within anti-Islam movements and counter-extremism responses towards such groups. William has taught undergraduate courses and given lectures on the radical right in Western Europe; both at the social movement and party political level. Previous consultancy has included delivering counter narrative engagement sessions in the North East of England and putting together a 'Countering Radical Right Narratives' educational pack. As of April 2019, William Allchorn is the Associate Director of CARR.

The views expressed in this practical Guide are the opinions of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Hedayah, the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right or the European Union.
Radical right extremism in the UK has undergone a significant transition in the past ten years. With the decline of the anti-fascist British National Party and also (latterly) the eurosceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP), radical right extremist actors have increasingly exchanged candidates at the ballot box for boots on the street as the main form of organisation and mobilisation within the UK. The most significant example of this transformation has been the rise of anti-Islamist street protest – with groups like the English Defence League, Britain First and Democratic Football Lads Alliance opposing what they see as the ‘Islamisation’ of UK society and public life.

Moreover, concomitant and in parallel to these developments, there has been a steady rise in non-aligned and organised forms of radical right political violence – with increases in identity-based violence (IBV) against minorities happening after Islamist terror attacks in 2013 & 2017. Added to this, two radical right terror attacks were perpetrated on UK soil in 2016 & 2017. Hovering in the background at this time of transition, radical right extremists have largely championed Brexit in the past few years – using populist and nationalist concerns to mainstream their messages. Like with recent terror attacks, there has also been an increase in hate crimes since the 2016 EU referendum (see figure 1 in the following page).

Added to this, other forms of direct action (besides street protests) have also become a key part of the UK radical right’s modus operandi – with streamed actions co-ordinated against minorities, journalists and elected officials by the UK Yellow Vests & Britain First being incorporated within the two group’s repertoire of action. The latter group in particular have become known for their Mosque invasions and Christian patrols in densely populated Muslim areas. Whilst radical right terror attacks have not been as frequent as in the US (9 versus 41 in the final 2016-2018 period recorded by the Global Terrorism Database), there does however appear to be a concerning upstream picture of radical right extremist violence.
that has become the ‘fastest-growing’ source of work for counter terror officials tasked with preventing, contesting and disrupting terrorist violence in the UK. 12

This country report then focuses on the UK at a time of heightened radical right extremist concern and transition. Here ‘radical right extremism’ is used to describe a broad plethora of cognate paramilitary groups, groupuscules and lone-actor terrorists that could be considered as harbouring violent nativist, authoritarian and (sometimes) populist policy ideas. 13 These include individuals and groups who actively ‘espouse violence’ and ‘seek the overthrow of liberal democracy’ entirely rather than simply ‘a critique of the constitutional order without any anti-democratic behaviour or intention’. 14 These are often referred to as the extreme right rather than the radical right, and range from lone-actor terrorists through to non-violent anti-Islam groups and finally to a range of formally constituted neo-fascist and neo-Nazi political parties that inspire terrorist action.

The first part of this report surveys the activities of thirteen key radical right extremist groups and the anti-Muslim populist, ethno-nationalist, masculinist and anti-globalist narratives that they propagate at the present moment – with a keen focus on propensity to violence. Using these case study examples, the second part will then suggest guidance for – and examples of – counter narratives that can be posed in relation to these dominant frames. This will flow into the next section that will focus on existing counter narrative campaigns in the UK context. Finally, the report will conclude with further recommendations for practitioners when conducting campaigns to counteract violent radical right extremist messages.

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12 Dodd, V. & Grierson, J., ‘Fastest-growing UK terrorist threat is from far right, say police’, The Guardian, 19 September 2019, online at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/sep/19/fastest-growing-uk-terrorist-threat-is-from-far-right-say-police.
Despite being electorally moribund, a plethora of radical right extremist protest movements & groupuscules\(^1\) still animate the UK’s largely post-organisational radical right extremist landscape. Within each of these categories, each group mobilise around a wide range of different ideologies, grievances and modes of action. Moreover, the liminality between non-violence and violence within these narratives is important to observe (see figure 2 below).\(^2\) Below therefore is a list of radical right organisations that are active at the present time – broken down according to the level of violence exhibited as well as their position on a spectrum between ideological mainstreamness and extremism. This includes examples of key narratives that they are presenting at the present moment and a summary of these narratives in Table 1.

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\(^1\) Here, ‘Groupuscules’ are defined as tiny, often neo-Nazi, bands of radical right extremists that establish a milieu with reference points that stretch out internationally as well as into the past as well (Jackson 2014, National Action and National Socialism for the 21st Century, 101).

FIGURE 2 Overview of UK Radical Right Extremist Groups
(Horizontal Axis: Mainstreamness of Narrative, Vertical Axis: Incidence of Violence)

18 Here, ‘mainstreamness’ can be measured by the adoption of moderate narratives (usually involving a broad issue agenda, anti-establishment populism and electoralism) compared to clearly extreme, esoteric positions and modus operandi (e.g. street activism and terrorism) taken by fringe groups (De Lange, Akkerman and Rooduijn, Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe, 2016).

19 Here, ‘violence’ is measured as part of the narrative logics within a group and its mode of activism. Whilst EDL and DFLA activists have been prone to violence and violent rhetoric, the dominant trend within these groups has been toward non-violent forms of rhetoric and activism, whilst in more Neo-Nazi groups (e.g. National Action, Order of the 9 Angles and Misanthropic Division), there has been more overt trends of violent activism, perpetrated on outsiders and group members.

TABLE 1: Overview of UK Radical Right Extremist Narratives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXTREMIST NARRATIVE</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Globalist Sentiment</td>
<td>Here, ‘Anti-Globalism’ is defined as a sustained critique of globalisation and others forms of internationalism, based on anti-elitist sentiments.</td>
<td>‘With all of the anti-EU sites I host in Europe (I run nine in total on the continent), my goal is to give the patriots fighting European Union corruption and oppression total control over content.’ (UK Yellow Vests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Muslim Populism</td>
<td>Here, ‘Anti-Muslim Populism’ is defined as a fusion of anti-Muslim hatred and populist forms of nationalism, including tropes around Islamisation and negative depictions of Islam.</td>
<td>‘Islam is not a religion of peace. Islam is fascist and it's violent and we've had enough! They're chopping our soldiers’ heads off. This is Islam. That’s what we've seen today.’ (EDL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>Here, ‘Anti-Semitism’ is defined as expressions of anti-Jewish sentiment, including anti-Zionist positions.</td>
<td>‘Weakness on the Jewish question is simply unforgivable, ignorance is inexcusable.’ (NA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryanism</td>
<td>Here, ‘Aryanism’ is defined as the belief in an ethnically pure northern European race, based on biological characteristics.</td>
<td>‘We believe in the inequality of the races. And in the right of the Aryans to live. According to the laws of the folk.’ (O9A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianism</td>
<td>Here, ‘Christianism’ is defined as a civilizational and traditionalist interpretation of Christianity that sees the Christian religion as the defining feature of the ‘nation’ and/or Western Civilisation.</td>
<td>‘Britain First is committed to maintaining and strengthening Christianity as the foundation of our society and culture.’ (BF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Jihad Conspiracy Theory</td>
<td>Here, the ‘Counter-Jihad Conspiracy Theory’ refers to writings of Bat Y’er and the belief in a so-called ‘invasion’ by Muslim migrants, deemed to be facilitated by ruling elites.</td>
<td>‘...cronies in the police, councils and social services all think we should shut up ... they think its ok that collateral damage in their pathetic traitor appeasement of Islamic Saudi and Qatari investment ...’ (DFLA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco-Fascism</td>
<td>'eco-fascism’ is defined as ‘a radical blend of ethno-nationalism and authoritarianism, rooted in a belief that the land and the people are symbiotically interwoven, and form an organic whole.' (Forchtner, 2019, online at <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/eco-fascism-justifications-terrorist-violence-christchurch-mosque-shootings-and-el-paso-shootings/">https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/eco-fascism-justifications-terrorist-violence-christchurch-mosque-shootings-and-el-paso-shooting/</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Nationalism</td>
<td>'Ethno-Nationalism’ is defined as the unanimity of the nation and an ethnic in-group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Anti-Establishmentarianism</td>
<td>'Extreme Anti-Establishmentarianism’ is defined as anti-elite sentiments that tip over into revolutionary solutions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory | Here, the ‘Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory’ refers to the writings of Renaud Camus and the belief in a demographic replacement of native Europeans by non-European migrants, deemed to be facilitated by ruling elites.  
Declining birth rates, mass immigration and the sharp increase in Islamic parallel societies will lead to the almost complete destruction of European societies within a matter of decades if no countermeasures are taken.' (GI UK) |
| Hard Euroscepticism              | 'Hard Euroscepticism’ is contrasted with soft Euroscepticism – with the former ultimately prescriing exit from the European Union whilst the latter involving sustained critique from within.  
'We must fight for Brexit, we must fight for democracy. The DFLA expects every man and woman to do their duty.' (DFLA) |
| Homophobia                      | 'Homophobia’ is defined as anti-gay sentiments, including tropes related to demographic depletion and degeneracy.  
'AIDS isn’t a disease, it’s a cure to f*****y. Hail AIDS.' (SRN) |
| Identitarianism                  | According to José Pedro Zúquete (The Identitarians, 2018), Identitarians are a ‘quickly growing ethno-cultural transnational movement [aimed at “preserving” Europe’s ethno-cultural heritage] that, in diverse forms, originated in France and Italy and has spread into southern, central, and northern Europe.’ |
| Neo-Nazism                       | 'Neo-Nazism’ is defined as the adherence to the ideology of national socialism post-Hitler, including rejections of left liberalism and right-wing conservatism.  
‘When the day comes, we will not ask whether you swung to the right or whether you swung to the left; we will simply swing you by the neck.’ (SKD) |
| Satanism                         | 'Satanism’ is defined as occult practices that include the worship of Satan and rejection of Judeo-Christian religions, in favour of Nazism.  
as ‘originally used and meant, the term satan refers to some human being or beings who ‘diabolically’ plot or who scheme against…the Jews.’ (O9A) |
| Ultra-Nationalism                | Here, 'ultra-nationalism’ refers to an extreme loyalty or devotion to the nation – usually at the exclusion of others (Collins 2019, online at: [https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/ultranationalism](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/ultranationalism)).  
'Make it an act of treason to implement any policy or measure, or sign any agreement, that facilitates and / or results in significant numbers of foreigners entering the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom with the aim of settling.' (BF) |
| Ultra-Patriotism                 | Here, 'ultra-patriotism’ is defined as an extreme, but not always negative, love of country; it’s identity, culture and symbols.  
'We need a new England where all religions and colours feel proud of our flag and recognise how important our identity and culture is.’ (EDL) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Chauvinism</th>
<th>Here, ‘Violent Chauvinism’ is defined as actual or performative forms of violent masculinity, often in connection with ideas of virility and racial purity.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘While you are sitting around on Vkontakte. Or hanging out with your friends. Every day I’m training. To F**k up my opponent in a fight. We are the sober and angry youth!’ (MD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Misogyny</td>
<td>Here, ‘Violent Misogyny’ is defined as extreme antipathy or hatred towards a female ‘other’, usually related to an endangered form of masculinity and acted out in a violent manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Race Mixing Whores. Get the F***ing rope.’ (SKD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wodinism</td>
<td>Here, ‘Wodinism’ is defined as a form of neo-Paganism that fuses Aryanism with the worship of Norse Gods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Harken and respond to the call of the War-Arrow, that summons the host to defend the Kinfolk, or to avenge wrongs done to the Kinfolk. A warrior’s death in the struggle for the freedom and survival of the Folk secures a place with the Gods in Valhalla. Woden awaits the brave in the Halls of Valhalla.’ (WF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Combat 18

**Leader**
- William Browning

**Membership**
- 30-40

### Ideology
- Neo-Nazism
- Ethno-Nationalism
- Anti-Semitism

### Narrative Examples

**Neo-Nazism:**
- “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children”
- 14 words from David Lane’s *Turner Diaries* – a key text for Combat 18 activists.22

**Ethno-Nationalism:**
- “Whatever it takes, oedent dum metaetan, White Revolution is the only solution”
- Combat 18 motto.21

**Anti-Semitism:**
- “Zyklon-B: over six million satisfied customers. Manufactured by Combat 18”
- Poster produced by South African National Socialist terrorist group and inspired by Combat 18.24

## National Action

**Leaders**
- Benjamin Raymond
- Alex Davies

**Membership**
- Unknown

### Ideology
- Neo-Nazism
- Anti-Semitism
- Anti-Establishment

### Narrative Examples

**Neo-Nazism:**
- “Hitler wasright”
- Gar neonmp’s anti-semitic tweet directed at former Jewish MP Luciana Berger.26

**Anti-Semitism:**
- “Weakness on the Jewish question is simply unforgivable, ignorance is inexcusable”
- Interview with National Action activists.27

**Anti-Establishment:**
- “Death to traitors, freedom for Britain”
- Slogan on National Action Website and Slogan of Thomas Mair.28

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Description

Started in 2018, Sonnenkrieg Division (or SKD) is the third iteration of proscribed UK Neo-Nazi terror group, National Action. Fostering links with similarly violent Neo-Nazi groups in the US as part of a broader transnational Siege sub-culture, SKD has used online 'gaming' forums (such as Discord) to communicate secretly and anonymously between its members. Using largely the same ideology as NA, SKD has demonstrated a trend towards Satanism, paedophilia and rape – sectioning itself off at the very extremes of the UK radical right. Last December (2018), SKD co-leader, Oskar Koczorowski, pleaded guilty in court to two counts of encouraging terrorism, while sexual offence allegations against another member of SKD are currently outstanding. Like SRN, SKD has largely acted as a discussion forum – though reports emerged of torture directed against one of its female members in December 2018. The BBC investigation also unearthed artwork calling for the assassination of Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex, and police officers. Such artwork can still be found online.

As of February 2020, the group has now been proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the Home Secretary.

Narrative Examples

Neo-Nazism:
“When the day comes, we will not ask whether you swung to the right or whether you swung to the left; we will simply swing you by the neck”

SKD poster shared on Fascist Forge website.

Satanism:
“When there’s nowhere to hide and there’s nowhere to run. All you can do is look to the Sun”

KD poster shared on Sonnenkrieg Division’s Gab.ai account.

Violent Misogyny:
“Race Mixing Whores. Get the f***ing rope”

SKD poster shared on Gab.ai user Commando’s account.

NARRATIVE EXAMPLES

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Non-Violent & Extreme Radical Right Groups in the UK

Liberty Defenders

Leaders
James Goddard
Timothy Scott
Jack Sen

Membership
30 (est.)

Ideology
Counter Jihad
Conspiracy Theory

English Defence League

Leader
Alan Spence

Membership
Unknown

Ideology
Anti-Muslim Populism

Democratic Football Lads Alliance

Leaders
Kevin Kerwick
Phil Hickin
Mark Turnbull

Membership
1,000

Ideology
Counter Jihad
Conspiracy Theory

Generation Identity UK

Leaders
Benjamin Jones
Charlie Fox
Charlie Shaw
Scot Sylvester Williams
William McNeill
David Wright

Membership
Unknown

Ideology
‘Great Replacement’
Conspiracy Theory

Identitarianism

‘Great Replacement’
Conspiracy Theory

Ethno-Nationalism

Non-Violent & Extreme Radical Right Groups in the UK

Leaders
Andrew Dymock
Oskar Koczorowski

Membership
Unknown

Ideology
Neo-Nazism
Satanism
Violent Misogyny

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Ethno-Nationalism
## Non-Violent & Extreme Radical Right Groups in the UK

### System Resistance Network (SRN)
- **Leaders:** Alex Davies, Austin Ross
- **Membership:** 10
- **Ideology:** Neo-Nazism, Anti-Establishment Extremism, Homophobia

### Order of Nine Angles (O9A)
- **Leaders:** David Myatt, Richard Mound, Michael Mouthwork
- **Membership:** Unknown
- **Ideology:** Neo-Nazism, Satanism, Aryanism

### Misanthropic Division (MD)
- **Leaders:** Francesco Saverio Fontana, Jimmy Hey, Robin Gray
- **Membership:** Unknown
- **Ideology:** Neo-Nazism, Ethno-Nationalism, Violent Chauvinism

### Woden’s Folk
- **Leaders:** Garron Helm, Ebony Helm
- **Membership:** 20-30 (est.)
- **Ideology:** Wodinism, Neo-Nazism, Eco-Fascism

### Woden’s Folk

### Leaders
- James Goddard
- Timothy Scott
- Jack Sen

### Membership
- 30 (est.)

### Ideology
- Counter-Jihad Conspiracy Theory
- Anti-Establishment Extremism
- Anti-Globalist Sentiment

### Description
Founded in late 2018 by former PEGIDA UK leader Timothy Scott and former BNP activist Jack Sen, the UK chapter of the Yellow Vest movement (self-styled as the ‘Liberty Defenders’) have been engaged in direct action campaigns against politicians and journalists up and down the UK. Largely self-directed and with a nebulous list of concerns, the group champions a conspiracist and right-wing populist line on the role of Islam and the European Union in UK public life. Taking on a more vigilante style of radical right activism, key member James Goddard has been arrested after harassing a Conservative MP Anna Soubry and journalist Owen Jones as well as hurling abuse at a car he thought contained UK Opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn.

The group has also been linked to more established UK neo-fascist actors within the UK’s radical right extremist milieu. Prominent experts on the UK radical right have noted how the Yellow Vests demonstrate a trend toward ‘risk of disorder and violence’ through this new, confrontational style of activism.

### Narrative Examples

#### Counter-Jihad Conspiracy Theory:
“...This place needs closing down, along with every other Mosque, that currently blemishes [sic] our great country. Why do our political classes allow these places, to stay open. When they preach hate and intolerance against anyone, that isn't [a] Muslim.”
- *A Social Media post by James Goddard on the UK Parliament and Mosques*

#### Anti-Establishment Extremism:
“You are a traitor, you are a disgrace. You are on the side of Adolf Hitler.”
- *James Goddard's comments to Anna Soubry MP (19th December 2018)*

#### Anti-Globalist Sentiment:
“With all of the anti-EU sites I host in Europe (I run nine in total on the continent), my goal is to give the patriots fighting European Union corruption and oppression total control over content”
- *Jack Sen’s comments in relation to Irexit (19th December 2018)*

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Founded in June 2009, the English Defence League emerged from an instance of tit-for-tat radicalisation in the Bedfordshire town of Luton. Proceeding from that autumn onwards, the movement spread its unique brand of anti-Muslim and ultra-patriotic protest to several towns and cities across the UK. Due to splits within the leadership in late 2012 and exit of its largely young activist base, the EDL entered terminal decline – with its main founder Tommy Robinson leaving the movement in October 2013. The organisation is still active in Newcastle, Manchester, Liverpool, London, Worcester but is now largely moribund. This is mainly due to the lack of good and visible leadership since Tommy Robinson’s exit but also more recently to the emergence of a larger anti-Islamic protest organisation, the (Democratic) Football Lads Alliance.

Anti-Muslim Populism:

“Islam is not a religion of peace. Islam is fascist and it’s violent and we’ve had enough! They’re chopping our soldiers’ heads off. This is Islam. That’s what we’ve seen today.”


Counter-Jihad Conspiracy Theory:

“We need strong leadership, not cowards who are begging petrol dollars and wanting a block Islamic vote. We need a leader not an appeaser. I’d rather die on my feet than live on my knees. Stand up for what u believe. Never be intimidated by anyone #english #nosurrender.”

- Tommy Robinson, Tweet (1st July 2014).

Ultra-Patriotism:

“We need a new England where all religions and colours feel proud of our flag and recognise how important our identity and culture is.”

- Tommy Robinson, Huffington Post.

Founded in June 2017, the initial iteration of the DFLA, the more moderate Football Lads Alliance (FLA), emerged in reaction to several ISIS-inspired terror attacks that occurred in the UK from March to June 2017. Harmony within the fledgling street movement was short-lived, however. On 16th April 2018, John Meighan stepped down as leader of the FLA over a fundraising row concerning donations to the Royal British Legion. This led to the creation of a separate True Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA) movement, whose more extreme ideology and organisational tactics became apparent over the course of 2018 - with particularly violent protest in Sunderland in September of that year cementing its reputation for extremism. Since this particularly problematic episode, however, the DFLA has however now largely dropped of the UK’s extreme right protest scene – save for one pro-Brexit, counter protest in October 2019.

Anti-Muslim Populism:

“Happy Christmas you filthy animals. Right eye opener.”

- John Meighan, FLA Founder, Facebook Post posting next to book on ‘W by Muslims Kill for Islam’.

Counter-Jihad Conspiracy Theory:

“…cronies in the police, councils and social services all think we should shut up … they think its ok that collateral damage in their pathetic traitor appeasement of Islamic Saudi and Qatari investment…”

- DFLA Website (22rd October 2018).

Hard Euroscepticism:

“We must fight for Brexit, we must fight for democracy. The DFLA expects every man and woman to do their duty”

- DFLA Facebook Post (29th March 2019).
Launched in October 2017, the UK chapter of the pan-European ethno-nationalist movement, Generation Identity, tracks a marginal presence on the UK radical right. The movement has mainly relied upon high-profile publicity stunts (such as the unfurling of banners, ad-hoc soup kitchens or sticker campaigns) and slick online social media campaigns to gain new followers. Moreover, it is different from other traditional radical right organisation in Britain due to its courting of middle-class student-aged activists. Indeed, this is typical of the wider Generation Identity movement – with many of its key activities being former law, political science or philosophy students. More recently links with radical right terrorists internationally and unsuccessful infiltration of the UK domestically have plagued the organisation – with a formal split from the main European chapter occurring in August 2019 over alt-right YouTubers at their national conference and the creation of a ‘new organisation called the ‘Identitarian Movement’ as a direct result.

Identitarianism:
“We believe in true diversity in which all peoples have a right to preserve and promote their group identity in their homelands.”
- Generation Identity UK ‘Demands’ Webpage.

Ethno-Nationalism:
“We want to preserve our peoples’ ethnocultural identity: an identity that is anchored in common consensus and viewed as a fundamental right in our society.”
- Generation Identity UK ‘Demands’ Webpage.

‘Great Replacement’ Conspiracy Theory:
“Declining birth rates, mass immigration and the sharp increase in Islamic parallel societies will lead to the almost complete destruction of European societies within a matter of decades if no countermeasures are taken.”
- Generation Identity UK ‘FAQs’ Webpage.

Now largely defunct, System Resistance Network (or SRN) became active in 2017 after the proscription of National Action (NA) as a terrorist organisation by the UK Home Office. Mainly NA activists – using similar forms of Nazi ideology and violent extremism – until August 2018 when the group disbanded, therefore populated it. Previously named Vanguard Britannia, small pockets of SRN activists were involved in putting up anti-leftist, homophobic and anti-refugee posters in Dundee, Swansea, Cardiff and Bristol during its short existence. After their 2018 fallout, SRN members then went on to create the UK chapter of the violent US Neo-Nazi group, Atomwaffen Division – calling itself ‘Sonnenkrieg Division’ or ‘Sun War Division’, a version of Atomwaffen Division but with ‘less guns’. The group was therefore largely a ‘front’ organisation for NA activists from the previously proscribed radical right terror group and lived a relatively short existence.

As of February 2020, the group has now been proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the Home Secretary.11

Neo-Nazism:
“The National Socialist never capitulates. He will never negotiate away his freedom. He will never compromise his ideals. We are revolutionary National Socialists united by struggle: the struggle against the System.”
- An excerpt from SRN’s website.

Extreme Anti-Establishmentarianism:
“Our imperative is the destruction of the System. A system that imports non-Whites en masse to rape our children and colonise our country whilst criminalising any pushback from the public.”
- An excerpt from SRN’s website.

Homophobia:
“AIDS isn’t a disease, it’s a cure to fa**otry. Hail AIDS.”
- Excerpt from SRN’s website.

System Resistance Network (SRN)

LEADERS
Alex Davies
Austin Ross

MEMBERSHIP
10

IDEOLOGY
Neo-Nazism

Anti-establishment Extremism

NARRATIVE EXAMPLES

DESCRIPTION

- An excerpt from SRN's website.
- An excerpt from SRN's website.
- Excerpt from SRN's website.
- Excerpt from SRN’s website.

NARRATIVE EXAMPLES

DESCRIPTION

- Generation Identity UK ‘FAQs’ Webpage.
- Generation Identity UK ‘Demands’ Webpage.
- Generation Identity UK ‘Demands’ Webpage.
- Generation Identity UK ‘FAQs’ Webpage.

- In the periods after proscription, a former National Action activist also claimed as part of Telegram group named the ‘Triple K Mafia’ (or Ku Klux Klan mafia) – a nod to US white supremacists.
- BRC News, ‘System Resistance Network: Neo-Nazi group ‘should be illegal’, 3 December 2018, online at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-46196424
- Spears, R. & Warrill, J., ‘UK bans neo-extreme-lighting groups under terror laws’, Financial Times, 24 February 2020, online at: https://www.ft.com/content/60b6c-b7e3-4c88-80a55-ab5765d323a1

The O9A was formed in the 1960s by the coming together of three Shropshire-based Dark Pagan covens – Camlad, the Temple of the Sun and the Noctuliars. A Nazi-Satanist group, O9A deifies Hitler and the Third Reich, which are regarded as having attempted to create a “Satanic empire” in order to achieve the destiny of the western world. One of its earliest adherents was David Myatt who has written most of the group’s literature. In the 1990s, the group’s leadership was taken over by a former Combat 18 activist and National Social Movement activist, Richard Mould. Disruption and subversion are two tactics widely encouraged by the O9A. Destabilising society through terror and acts of sabotage formed a central theme of Myatt’s writings while he was associated with C18 (see above). Like Woden Folk, O9A has been linked to other violent Neo-Nazi groups in the UK, including National Action and its later iteration of Sonnenkrieg Division. It also has inspired other international covens of Nazi-Satanism, including New Zealand-based “The Black Order”, the Australian-based “Temple of Them” and Californian-based “White Star Association”, UK anti-fascist collective, Hope Not Hate, suggest that the violent extremist threat posed by O9A is currently underestimated. O9A’s acts of terrorism have been characterised as a “Satanic empire” and have been described as a terrorist organisation by the Home Secretary. As of February 2020, Hope not Hate called for Order of Nine Angles to be proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the Home Secretary.

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ORDER OF NINE ANGLES (O9A)

LEADERS
David Myatt
Richard Mould
Michael Mouthwork

MEMBERSHIP
Unknown

IDEOLOGY
Neo-Nazism
Satanism
Aryanism

Neo-Nazism:

“Adolf Hitler was sent by our gods. To guide us to greatness.”

- Words contained in Mass of Heresy in O9A’s Black Book of Satan.

Satanism:

“As originally used and meant, the term satan refers to some human being or beings who ‘diabolically’ plot or who scheme against…the Jews.”

- Words of David Myatt in a 2013 interview.

Aryanism:

“We believe in the inequality of the races. And in the right of the Aryans to live. According to the laws of the folk.”

- Words contained in Mass of Heresy in O9A’s Black Book of Satan.

MISANTHROPIC DIVISION (MD)

LEADERS
Francesco Saverio Fontana
Jimmy Hey
Robin Gray

MEMBERSHIP
Unknown

IDEOLOGY
Neo-Nazism
Ethno-Nationalism
Violent Chauvinism

Neo-Nazism:

“No more refugees. Stop Immigration. Stop the Invasion.”

- Number one of fourteen guiding principles published by Misanthropic Division International.

Ethno-Nationalism:

“No more refugees. Stop Immigration. Stop the Invasion.”

- Poster at Edinburgh March 2016 demonstration.

Violent Chauvinism:

“When you are sitting around on Vkontakte. Or hanging out with your friends. Every day I’m training, To f**k up my opponent in a fight. We are the sober and angry youth.”

- Popular song among Azov Battalion fighters.

Largely a recruiting body for sending UK Neo-Nazis to be involved in the Ukrainian civil war, Misanthropic Division (or MD) provides a mirror image to Jihadist-aligned individuals being sent to fight in Syria – showing the UK radical right’s violent intent beyond the borders of the UK. With strong connections to Poland, Japan and South America, Misanthropic Division’s operations were disrupted in 2017 due to reports of the group’s activities being shared with Ukraine’s embassy in the UK. Previously active in Greater Manchester, West London, and the Republic of Ireland, mass arrests in June 2017 led to the group’s operations grinding to a halt until more stable lines of recruitment can be re-opened with the pro-Nazi Ukranian-based militia, called “Azov Battalion.” Latest reports show that the group’s international chapters are still active on ‘surface web’ platforms, such as Facebook, but with no real offline activity.

Misanthropic Division was a Neo-Nazi group formed in 2015 by James Gamble in the UK, with the goal of creating a “Satanic empire” and destabilizing society through terror and acts of sabotage. The group’s leaders, Francesco Saverio Fontana and Jimmy Hey, were involved in the Ukrainian civil war, with Fontana being linked to the pro-Nazi Azov Battalion. The group was disrupted in 2017 due to reports of its activities being shared with Ukraine’s embassy in the UK. However, latest reports show that the group’s international chapters are still active on ‘surface web’ platforms, such as Facebook, but with no real offline activity.
WODEN'S FOLK

LEADERS
Garron Helm
Ebony Helm

MEMBERSHIP
20-30 (est.)

IDEOLOGY

Wodinism:
“Harken and respond to the call of the War-Arrow, that summons the host to defend the Kinfolk, or to avenge wrongs done to the Kinfolk. A warrior’s death in the struggle for the freedom and survival of the Folk secures a place with the Gods in Valhalla. Woden awaits the brave in the Halls of Valhalla.”
- The Woden’s Folk Code of Honour

Neo-Nazism:
“Wodinism is not ‘nationalism’ in any form since it transcends this, as it transcends the false ‘left-right’ divide that splits a nation.”
- Woden Folk - Religion

Eco-Fascism:
“One Land - England! One Blood - Blood Kin! One Folk - The English Folk!”
- Wodenic Magazine

WOODEN'S FOLK

Eco-Fascism

Neo-Nazism

Wodinism

NARRATIVE EXAMPLES

DESCRIPTION

Anti-Muslim Populism:
“Our security is at high risk due to garments such as the burka and niqab being used to cover criminal and/or terrorist activities. A ban on them will increase public safety and security.”
- Britain First Petition Webpage

Ultra-Nationalism:
“Make it an act of treason to implement any policy or measure, or sign any agreement, that facilitates and / or results in significant numbers of foreigners entering the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom with the aim of settling.”
- Britain First Policies Webpage

Christianism:
“Britain First is committed to maintaining and strengthening Christianity as the foundation of our society and culture.”
- Britain First Principles Webpage

For example, reports suggest that Mair shouted: ‘Britain first, keep Britain independent, Britain will always come first’ during his murderous rampage. See: Cobain, I., Parveen, N. and Taylor, M., ‘The slow-burning hatred that led Thomas Mair to murder Jo Cox’, The Guardian, 23 November 2016, online at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/23/thomas-mair-slow-burning-hatred-led-to-jo-cox-murder

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BRITAIN FIRST

LEADER
Paul Golding

MEMBERSHIP
300

DESCRIPTION

Formed in 2011 using the website ‘British Resistance’, Britain First was founded by former BNP fundraiser, Jim Dowson, and BNP Sevenoaks Councillor, Paul Golding. As one June 2014 report on the group by anti-fascist collective, Hope not Hate, has suggested, the group has largely eschewed ‘scientific racial hatred and ideas of racial supremacy in favour of dire biblical warnings...in the face of the supposed Islamification of Britain.’ Looking beyond its anti-Islam ideology, however, Britain First has been most famous for its direct action tactics – whether that be invading Mosques, driving ex-military land-rovers down Brick Lane or conducting flash demonstrations in predominantly Muslim areas up and down the country. Since the 2016 EU referendum, however, Britain First has been in terminal decline and has largely limited its activism to the Northern Ireland. The most obvious reason for this is the group’s associations with Thomas Mair,7” the killer of UK MP Jo Cox in Birstall, but also a set of unrelated police prosecutions and restrictions that made protesting in England and Wales almost impossible,
As we can see from the above survey of UK-based radical right extremist actors at this time, most groups appear to revolve around a constellation of anti-Muslim populist, ethno-nationalist, masculinist & anti-globalist positions – with a large dose of victimhood, accelerationism and imminence in the way that the narratives are delivered. Such narratives – particularly amongst the street protest scene – are symptomatic of a broader shift by Western radical right groups away from the toxicity of anti-Semitism and towards more mainstream forms of anti-Muslim prejudice.80 We can also see how the immediate and simplified nature of these narratives have the potential to be perceived as a ‘call of action’ for those on the fringes of these movements – heightening the possibility of narrative escalation that might ultimately lead to terrorist violence.81

Drawing on a recent RAN meeting note for inspiration,82 these narratives can be simplified to the following broad positions – characterised by an:

1. Anti-Muslim Populism Narrative – i.e. national & cultural identities are under threat because of Islam, elites are complicit, this ends in clash of civilisations.

2. Ethno-Nationalist Narrative – i.e. ethnic identities are under threat, elites are complicit in ‘white genocide’, this ends in race war and/or a ‘great replacement’.

3. Masculinist Narrative – i.e. societies are under threat because men cannot live ‘according to their nature’, feminists & LGBT community are considered traitors.

4. Anti-Globalist Narrative – i.e. the EU, NATO, the UN & multinational companies have too much power over us, their role is to ostensibly to keep ‘the people’ down, we must withdraw with immediate effect.

5. Victimhood Narrative – i.e. Governments favour ethnic and religious minorities over the majority white population, anti-PC comments lead to persecution, our views are being silenced and suppressed at the expense of freedom of speech.


81 Indeed, in Sarah Cobb’s (2013) book on Narrative Dynamics in Conflict Resolution, she finds that conflict escalation is inversely related to narrative complexity – the simpler and harder line the narrative, the more likely it will lead to oscillator (p.88).

PART TWO
RADICAL RIGHT COUNTER NARRATIVES AND COUNTER NARRATIVE CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

TAPPING INTO ANTI-MUSLIM POPULIST, ETHNO-NATIONALIST, MASCULINIST AND ANTI-GLOBALIST POSITIONS

Constructing counter narratives in order to disrupt, de-legitimise and devalue the appeal of these narratives, it is useful to identify ‘entry points’ within the structure of extremist narratives in order to unpick the veracity, authenticity and believability of such narratives. As modelled in the examples suggested in the above summary, this can be done by breaking down such narratives into their orientation (i.e. who, what, where, how & when), action (i.e. evaluation of orientation) and resolution (i.e. prescribed course of action) structure.

Whilst it might be unprofitable to contest the factual veracity of the orientation statement, both the action and solution sections of the narrative might be more profitably contested. Below are some key counter-narratives that could deployed by practitioners to respond to the UK radical right extremist messages could identified above:

1. Anti-Muslim Populism Counter Narrative – i.e. highlight the positive contribution of Muslims to country’s livelihood, acknowledge prejudice but foster more open viewpoints and a less formulaic or rigid conception of Islam.

2. Ethno-Nationalist Counter Narrative – i.e. highlight zero-sum view of migration and positive economic benefits, acknowledge fears and grievances, work to de-escalate imminence of ‘threat’ frame and legitimacy of ‘separate people groups’ idea.

3. Masculinist Counter Narrative – i.e. create a new, inclusive definition of masculinity, in which feminists and LGBTI activists have empowered rather than emasculated society overall. Move beyond a reductive view of masculinity to a notion of social construction.

4. Anti-Globalist Counter Narrative – i.e. emphasise democratic legitimacy of international organisations and need to ‘get involved’ to change the ‘system’. Talk of economic and political benefits as well as shared European values as basis for discussing difference.

5. Victimhood Counter Narrative – i.e. educate citizens regarding what they can and cannot expect from their governments, media and the state. Advise them about how they can get their voices heard through legitimate channels. Ask what perspectives aren’t being listened to.

*This is a simplified version of a similar schema, laid out in: Labov, W., & Waletzky, J., ‘Narrative analysis: Oral versions of personal experience, Journal of Narrative & Life History, 7(1-4), 1997, 3-38, online at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714409709376005.*
Turning from radical right narratives and counter narratives toward counter narrative campaigns, the UK has been at the forefront of global efforts to foster counter narrative best practice for some time now.46 Added to this, there has been a concerted effort by the UK government to move beyond Islamist terrorism and tackle radical right extremism after the inception of the 2011 version of the Prevent Strategy,47 but also due to recent requirements on statutory bodies to report violent extremism under the Prevent Duty (2015). Below are some examples of campaigns and methodologies that have been used by the UK Government-funded projects, NGOs and the independent tech sector toward radical right groups based in the UK.

Some of the earliest, formal interventions during the current period towards radical right extremist movements in the UK were used to disrupt and delegitimise narratives of the anti-Islamic English Defence League that reached its peak between 2009 and 2012. These were delivered by anti-fascist and anti-racism NGOs, Searchlight Educational Trust and Show Racism the Red Card, and included the former devising newsheets and community events, the latter delivering interactive seminars with young people in four areas vulnerable to English Defence League activity: 

- the former devising newsheets and community events
- the latter delivering interactive seminars with young people between the ages of 11 and 18 to ‘reject the narratives’ by delivering interactive seminars with young people in four areas vulnerable to English Defence League activity
- the UK Government-funded projects, NGOs and the independent tech sector toward radical right groups based in the UK.

Moving from more formal to informal attempts at countering the messages of the EDL, at the same time, there were more comedic efforts to counter the group’s anti-Muslim populist narratives by the online antifascist collective – the English Disco Lover’s. Formed in 2012, this counter campaign group was initially founded to satirise and eclipse coverage of the EDL. English Disco Lovers’ most high-profile campaign, however, was a “Google bombing” attempt – hijacking the EDL acronym to outrank its radical right equivalent on search engines and social media.48 The campaign was broadly successful on Facebook at least – in July 2017, the English Disco Lovers were found to have almost ten times as many likes on Facebook as the English Defence League.49 The group’s action also attracted widespread press attention50 & led to copycat counter protest initiatives at EDL demonstrations in Brighton51, Cambridge52 and Birmingham.53 The campaign’s light-hearted framing gave it wide appeal – with many copycat iterations of its online efforts appearing around the world. Such an easily replicable formula is ideal for a campaign that hopes to leverage its popularity against a fringe extremist movement. Here, we can also see how more informal campaigns might gain more traction than formal interventions – as argued by Lee (2019).54

Adding to this portfolio of informal UK-based counter narrative campaigns were those conducted against EDL successor group, Britain First. An attempt to counter Britain First’s anti-Muslim populist and ultra-nationalist messages, ‘Britain First’ was founded in 2014 as a Facebook and then Twitter parody page. The campaign involved issuing memes reminiscent of those disseminated by Britain First but added a satirical twist – with posts that talked about ‘Halal Sunglasses’, ‘Muslamic Timepieces’ and likening Britain First’s uniform to bin liners.55 Each of these campaigns received 39 retweets/14 likes/comments, 21 retweets/19 likes/2 comments and 65 retweets/24 likes/5 comments respectively. So successful was the campaign that Britain First took notice and reported the group to Facebook.56

It was the subject of a number of national news articles – inspiring successor accounts and initiatives by other online activists, even beyond the main cycle of protest by the group itself.57 Again, here we can also see how more informal campaigns might be more agile and gain more traction in comparison to formal interventions – despite being largely up to a committed activist community to maintain.

More recent examples of tailored, formal counter narrative campaigns include Exit UK’s recently launched campaign.58 Using three stories of individuals that the organisation has helped in the past, they track a former gamer, football hooligan and soldier’s journey of radicalisation and entry into the UK-based radical right extremist movements. Each (short) video – receiving 116,422,17,080, and 4,496 views respectively - spells out the risks of becoming part of a radical right extremist organisation and the difficulties of exiting – demystifying and deglamourising participation in such movements. Moreover, they explain how day-to-day deprivations and grievances – related to a weak sense of identity, economic prosperity, and political representation – can be compounded and preyed upon by the radical right extremist organisations – acting as a useful resource for educators also.


47 See: https://isderesources.org.


50 See: https://isderesources.org.


52 As noted in Winter and Fürst (2018, Challenging Hate, 16), the English Disco Lovers had 63,834 likes, as compared with just 7,255 for the English Defence League. This


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58 The Prevent Strategy and Right-wing Extremism: A Case Study of the English Defence League

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60 See: https://exituk.org/stories.


62 The Prevent Strategy and Right-wing Extremism: A Case Study of the English Defence League

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68 The Prevent Strategy and Right-wing Extremism: A Case Study of the English Defence League

69 See: https://isderesources.org.


71 See: https://isderesources.org.

72 See: https://isderesources.org.

73 See: https://isderesources.org.

74 See: https://isderesources.org.

75 See: https://isderesources.org.

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97 See: https://isderesources.org.

98 See: https://isderesources.org.

Another example of a video campaign directed at educators is the London Grid for Learning’s ‘Counter-Extremism: Narratives and Conversations’ resource. Not so much a counter narrative campaign per se but a toolbox for teachers, this takes the user through a series of short tutorial videos with Professor of Politics at Kent University, Dr Matthew Goodwin, about the radical right in the UK but also counter narratives that can be deployed on the ground. In particular, the videos stress the importance of a non-argumentative approach that listens to grievances and stresses a ‘no outsider’ policy to conversations. Unfortunately, however, the only case example of a counter narrative that can be operationalised engages with the radical right’s ethno-nationalist framing that ‘immigrants are bad’. Moreover, there is something to be said about the limitations of using experts to deliver dialogue-heavy videos rather than more interactive content.

Moving onto online targeted methodologies, there have been several innovative methodology experiments conducted by UK-based organisations (Moonshot CVE and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue) in this space – mainly looking at the more violent end of the extremist spectrum. The former organisation has found a technique of using algorithms and natural language processing to anonymously identify individuals who are searching for and accessing extremist content online, and then delivering counter narrative videos and one-to-one interventions in order to dissuade them from radicalising further. Such preventative interventions have been pioneered by Google and YouTube under the Redirect Method (RedirectMethod.org). Obvious ethical queries and caveats apply here surrounding anonymity and privacy but they do show how online, computational methodologies could be exploited to make sure that the above counter narratives get through to the right audience, and therefore overcoming pre-existing concerns about counter narrative effectiveness. In the end, over 320,000 users were reached and the method saw an increase of up to 79% in engagement with counter narrative content.

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Moving on, there have been other proactive efforts to micro-target and identify individuals who need of further counselling and guidance to move them off violent extremist content. For example, one ISD-led initiative called 'counter conversations' engaged with individuals with both Islamist and radical right backgrounds. This effectively is one-step from counter narratives and posits an alternative by challenging extremist messages directly with online users one-to-one in order to help persuade individuals to exit online extremist milieus. Its results found that the approach was largely effective in sustaining conversations (64% of radical right extremist interactions) and providing a lasting positive impact on the trajectory of individuals selected for the pilot (10% overall). Whilst not a counter narrative per se, therefore, the 'counter conversations' method might be more targeted way of administering counter narratives as well as dealing with radicalising or radicalised radical right extremists who have a more hardened and rigid world view.

![FIGURE 8 Response of Radical Right Extremist to One-to-One Outreach](image)

This report has tracked UK radical right extremist narratives and counter narratives at a time of transition for the radical right. Moving from electoralism through street-based activism and into vigilantism and forms of terrorism, imminent, victimhood narratives around anti-Muslim hatred, the decline of a native in-group and masculine identity - as well as a rejection of globalist projects - have all come to a fore. These have become a rallying point for radical right extremist protest movements and (oftentimes violent) groupuscules who have attempted to popularise their discourse through wedge issues; both in the online and offline space. Such messages come at another, more violent crossroads for the UK radical right extremist milieus. Its results found that the approach was largely effective in sustaining conversations (64% of radical right extremist interactions) and providing a lasting positive impact on the trajectory of individuals selected for the pilot (10% overall). Whilst not a counter narrative per se, therefore, the 'counter conversations' method might be more targeted way of administering counter narratives as well as dealing with radicalising or radicalised radical right extremists who have a more hardened and rigid world view.

![FIGURE 9 Message Content of One-to-One Outreach](image)

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In response to such challenging circumstances, practitioners would be advised to find innovative and creative ways to deliver counter narratives that de-escalate such immensity, the impact of trigger events and (rather pessimistically) the fall-out of any future radical right extremist terror plot. Here, it is important to note that counter narratives work best when they are able to delegitimise the reductive, simplified and conspiratorial elements of radical right extremist narratives. Moreover, and based on the overview of radical right counter narrative campaigns above, counter narratives that take a non-argumentative approach and suggest an alternative narrative to grievances will work best here – diverting or ‘offraming’ individuals away from extremist propaganda and onto a different vision of where things are headed.

Finally, this report finds that the strongest radical right counter narrative campaign methodologies use informal actors, harness computational targeting and integrate process and impact statistics into their campaign plans. As noted in the review of counter narrative campaigns above, the agility and reactivity of grassroots campaign organisations is something to be harnessed – particularly when they come from credible voices. Moreover, by analysing and targeting those engaging with extremist content separately from mainstream members of society, we might be more proactive in preventing those who distribute radical right extremist messages in the first place. Such an approach might therefore stop the contagion of narratives upstream before they have a destabilising effect on public conversations as a whole – or before they slip into something altogether more sinister. Finally, and added to this, publication of process and impact statistics by NGOs and think-tanks conducting radical right counter narratives would make the assessment of effectiveness easier – promoting best practice and highlighting what is need to foster sustained attitudinal and behavioural change away from radical right sympathy and toward more mainstream forms of activism.

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104 Ibid: 17 & 20.

105 Dearden, L., 'Brexit: Far-right groups threaten to riot at London protests as Boris Johnson warned over language', The Independent, 9 September 2019, online at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-protests-london-riots-unrest-far-right-boris-johnson-no-deal-a9095161.html.
